Introduction
While it was not envisioned in the United Nations (UN) Charter or any official political document before it, peacekeeping today has become a fundamental and high-profile component of UN operations.
1 The UN defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of international military international interventions in order to assist in the peaceful transition of power. 5 Firstgeneration peacekeeping developed in a response to "breakaway group" mediation instead of as means to reinforce the traditional metropolitan or imperial power. 6 As a result, newly-emergent countries in the Afro-Asian world were both chief beneficiaries of and enthusiastic to peacekeeping efforts. 7 Disciplined national forces perceived external assistance to be both vital to state stability and a means to gain recognition and influence in international political forums. 8 Thus, first-generation peacekeeping and global humanitarian initiatives of mediation and aid often developed in the post-conflict phase where belligerents pragmatically preferred peace to war.
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By virtue of 'middle power' qualities unique to Canada within the context of the Cold War the country successfully pioneered and propagated peacekeeping initiatives through its involvement in UNEF I and UNEF II. The two main factors inhibiting UN superpowers from mounting decisive action on their own was the nuclear "balance of terror," and the fact that successful peacekeeping could not be executed by those states with a history of colonial, military, or economic exploitation in the region of question. 10 Canada's advantageous qualities of being a developed country with peaceful traditions and a reputation for respect and impartiality allowed it to emerge as a 'middle power' able to carry out the otherwise hindered security function of the UN. 11 For instance, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Lester B.
Pearson's successful creation of UNEF I in 1956, a innovatory emergency UN force, was contingent on convincing the Arabs of the Suez that the delegation was not acting as an agent historical connection to Great Britain and its membership in the Commonwealth. 57 The impetus of Canadian officials to engage in mediation efforts through UNEF I was motivated by the potentially adverse economic and political effects of the crisis on the Commonwealth, the UN, and most importantly, upon relations between the U.S. and Great Britain. 58 In particular, Canada equated its own national survival to Anglo-American cooperation within NATO 59 hence illustrating the degree to which it associated its national interest with the interest of the West.
In 1964, Canada participated in UNFICYP once again motivated by potentially adverse effects of two NATO partners, Turkey and Greece, in conflict over Cyprus. The intervention would inevitably involve and endanger Canada by virtue of its NATO obligations. 63 Thus, peacekeeping in the interest of the West, while having no direct impact on Canadian security, was nevertheless perceived to foster international stability from which Canadians benefitted. These two instances illustrated a profound dichotomy of Canadian interest: on one hand, interest in pursuing an independent and neutral 'peacekeeper' identity;
and on the other hand, interest determined by an Anglo-centric worldview.
Second, Canada's consistent identification with the West on occasion adversely affected its peacekeeping reputation. For instance, although the Egyptians during the Suez Crisis allowed UNEF I entry, they did so reluctantly and after having raised suspicion about the 
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The constantly-changing international atmosphere has compelled the UN and its members to correspondingly adapt its mandates and match its resources to the conflict it addresses. The conflict is no longer simply interstate, for which peacekeeping was initially developed, but something more complex: intrastate, cross-border, belligerent, and subject to external political and economic manipulation. If it fails to do so, history is testament to the destruction it causes entire peoples. Yet despite the many challenges facing global 72 Taylor and Cox, "Peacekeeping: International Challenge," 36. 
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The exorbitant material costs of on-the-ground operations coupled with low success potential has deterred even the most 'benevolent' of humanitarian countries from engaging peacekeepers too closely in conflict and post-conflict states-and Canada, too, is no exception.
The question becomes: how can one reverse peacekeeping's course from one of narrow functionality? The formal success of a peacekeeping mission is measured as whether it achieved its mandate. The answer perhaps lies in innovation within these mandates and an expansion of a peacekeeper's role to reflect on-the-ground challenges in a robust but responsible manner.
Fundamentally, however, the peacekeeper depends on boosted resources, aid, and troops backed by the UN in order to achieve its goals. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is simultaneously underfunded and overwhelmed in its numerous mandates. A critical addressing of the crippling institutional rules, dirty politics, and great funding disparities that limit humanitarian efforts within the framework of the UN Security Council-hardly a neutral entity-is key if Canada is to drive peacekeeping higher onto the global agenda. "…the United 
